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Abstract
We study the testability implications of public versus private consumption
in collective models of group consumption. The distinguishing feature of our
approach is that we start from a revealed preference characterization of collec-
tively rational behavior. Remarkably, we find that assumptions regarding the
public or private nature of specific goods do have testability implications, even
if one only observes the aggregate group consumption. In fact, these testability
implications apply as soon as the analysis includes three goods and four ob-
servations. This stands in sharp contrast with existing results that start from
a differential characterization of collectively rational behavior. In our opinion,
our revealed preference approach obtains stronger testability conclusions be-
cause it focuses on a global characterization of collective rationality, whereas
the differential approach starts from a local characterization.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus that multi-person group (e.g. household) consumption
behavior should no longer be treated as if the group were a single decision maker that
optimizes a group utility function subject to the group budget constraint. Indeed, this
so-called unitary model of group consumption imposes empirically testable restrictions
on the group demand function (e.g. Slutsky symmetry) that are frequently rejected
when confronted with data on multi-person group consumption. See, for example,
Browning and Chiappori (1998) and references therein.
Because of these empirical problems of the unitary model, the collective model
has become increasingly popular to analyze group consumption behavior. Chiappori
(1988, 1992) originally introduced this model for describing household labor supply
behavior when all consumption is private and consumption externalities are absent
(i.e. individual preferences are egoistic). More recently, Browning and Chiappori
(1998) suggested a most general collective consumption model, which does account
for public consumption in addition to private consumption. This model also allows
for externalities related to privately consumed quantities. In addition, Browning
and Chiappori make the minimalistic assumption that the empirical analyst only
observes the aggregate consumption and does not know which part of the quantities
are publicly or privately consumed. Focusing on a ‘differential’ characterization of
this general model, they establish that for two-person groups collectively rational
group behavior requires a pseudo-Slutsky matrix that can be written as the sum of a
symmetric negative semi-definite matrix and a rank one matrix.1
Building further on the original work of Browning and Chiappori (1998), Chiap-
pori and Ekeland (2006) particularly focused on the testability conclusions regarding
the private and public nature of group consumption. Their main conclusion is that,
following a differential approach, “the private or public nature of consumption within
the group is not testable from aggregate data on group behavior”. More specifically,
they show that, when only observing the aggregate group consumption, the general
collective consumption model has exactly the same testability implications as two
more specific collective models, i.e. a first benchmark model that assumes all con-
sumption is public and a second benchmark model that assumes all consumption is
1The term differential refers to the fact that the characterization is obtained by integrating and/or
differentiating the functional specifications of the fundamentals (e.g. the individual preferences of
the group members) of the model.
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private and preferences are egoistic (i.e. no consumption externalities).
In this paper, we complement the results of Chiappori and Ekeland. In the tradi-
tion of Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982),2 we investigate the same testability questions
by focusing on the ‘revealed preference’ characterization of the collective consumption
model. Such a revealed preference characterization does not rely on any functional
specification regarding the group consumption process; it typically focuses on revealed
preference axioms that summarize the empirical implications of theoretical consump-
tion models. Our study extends earlier work of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2007, 2010a, 2010b), who developed the revealed preference characterization of the
(general and specific) collective consumption models mentioned above.
Remarkably, in contrast to the findings for the differential approach, we will con-
clude that our revealed preference approach does imply testability of privateness
versus publicness of consumption, even if one only observes the aggregate group con-
sumption. In addition, we will obtain that the model with all consumption public
is independent from (or non-nested with) the model that assumes all consumption is
private and preferences are egoistic: a data set that satisfies the revealed preference
conditions for the first model does not necessarily satisfy the conditions for the second
model, and vice versa.
How can we interpret this difference between the testability conclusions of our ap-
proach and the ones of the differential approach? Our explanation is that Chiappori
and Ekeland’s differential approach focuses on ‘local’ conditions for collective rational-
ity (which apply in a sufficiently small neighborhood of a given point). By contrast,
the revealed preference conditions on which we focus are ‘global’ by construction.3
In this interpretation, the global nature of the revealed preference conditions implies
stronger testability conclusions. In fact, we believe our results may have interesting
implications from the viewpoint of practical applications. For example, they suggest
that a practitioner may usefully apply the revealed preference characterization to
verify if the data satisfies a particular specification the collective model (in terms of
publicly and/or privately consumed goods), prior to the actual empirical analysis.
One final remark is in order before entering our analysis. Following a similar
revealed preference approach, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2010a) also con-
2See also Samuelson (1938), Houthakker (1950) and Diewert (1973) for seminal contributions on
the revealed preference approach to analyzing consumption behavior.
3See for example Hurwicz (1971) and Pollak (1990) for discussions on the difference between the
global revealed preference approach and the local differential approach.
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sidered testability of the private versus public nature of consumption within groups.
A specific feature of their analysis is that it allowed for non-convex preferences of the
individual group members. These authors obtain the same nontestability conclusion
as Chiappori and Ekeland (2006). Our following analysis differs from the one of Cher-
chye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2010a) in that we assume that individual preferences
are convex (and represented by concave utility functions); this assumption of con-
vex preferences follows the original analysis of Chiappori and Ekeland. As indicated
above, we now do obtain different testability implications under alternative assump-
tions on the (public or private) nature of goods. When comparing this to the findings
of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2010a), we conclude that the assumption of
convex preferences is crucial for obtaining our testability conclusions.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. To set the stage, Section 2 defines
collectively rational group consumption behavior in terms of the (general and specific)
collective models that we will consider. Section 3 discusses the revealed preference
characterization of such rational behavior. Section 4 shows our testability results
on public versus private consumption in the group. Section 5 summarizes our main
conclusions.
2 Collective rationality
Following Chiappori and Ekeland (2006, 2009), we will concentrate on three collective
consumption models in what follows. We will consider the general collective model
(general-CR) of Browning and Chiappori (1998) as well as two specific benchmark
models, i.e. the collective model with all goods public (public-CR) and the collective
model with all consumption private and egoistic preferences (egoistic-CR). In this
section we introduce the necessary concepts to study these three collective models.
Throughout, we consider groups (or households) that consist of two members.4
We assume a group that purchases the (non-zero) N -vector of quantities q ∈ RN+ with
corresponding prices p ∈ RN++. All quantities can be consumed privately, publicly, or
both. For the general collective model, we will assume that the empirical analyst has
no information on the decomposition of the observed q into the bundles of private
quantities q1,q2 and the bundle of public quantities qh. Therefore, we need to intro-
4The results below can be generalized towards the setting of M members, with M ≥ 2. However,
we believe that the core arguments underlying our results are better articulated for this simple case.
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duce (unobserved) feasible personalized quantities q̂ that comply with the (observed)
aggregate quantities q. More formally, we define
q̂ =
(
q1, q2, qh
)
with q1, q2, qh ∈ RN+ and q1 + q2 + qh = q.
Each q̂ captures a feasible decomposition of the aggregate quantities q into private
quantities and public quantities. This will be useful for modeling general preferences
that depend on private consumption as well as public consumption. In the following,
we consider feasible personalized quantities because we assume the minimalistic prior
that only the aggregate quantity bundle q and not the ‘true’ personalized quantities
are observed. Throughout, we will use that each q̂ defines a unique q.
The collective model explicitly recognizes the individual (convex) preferences of
the group members. For the general model, these preferences may depend not only
on the own private quantities and the public quantities, but also on the other indi-
vidual’s private quantities. This allows for externalities between the group members.
Formally, this means that the preferences of each group member m (m = 1, 2) can
be represented by a well-behaved utility function of the form Um(q1,q2, qh), with
q = q1 + q2 + qh and m = 1, 2.5
Suppose then that we observe T choices of N -valued bundles. For each observation
t the vector qt ∈ RN+ records the quantities chosen by the group under the prices
pt ∈ RN++ (with strictly positive components). We let S = {(pt,qt); t = 1, . . . , T}
be the corresponding set of T observations.6 A collective rationalization of a set of
observations S requires the existence of utility functions U1 and U2 such that each
observed quantity bundle can be characterized as Pareto efficient. Thus, we get the
following definition.
Definition 1 (general-CR) Let S = {(pt,qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observa-
tions. A pair of utility functions U1 and U2 provides a general-CR of S (i.e. a
collective rationalization in terms of the general collective model), if for each observa-
tion t there exist feasible personalized quantities q̂t such that U
m (ẑ) > Um (q̂t) implies
U l (ẑ) < U l (q̂t) (m 6= l) for all feasible personalized quantities ẑ with ptqt ≥ ptz.
The two benchmark cases considered below involve restrictions on the individual
5As in the differential approach, we say that a function is well-behaved if it is concave, differen-
tiable and monotonically increasing.
6For ease of exposition, the scalar product p′tqt is written as ptqt.
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preferences and the nature of the goods. In the first case we assume that all con-
sumption is public. We formalize this by assuming individuals preferences that are
represented by a well-behaved utility function Umpub(q
h). Clearly, in this case we have
qh = q (or q1 + q2 = 0), i.e. the true personalized quantities are effectively observed.
Given all this, Definition 1 directly leads to the following definition.
Definition 2 (public-CR) Let S = {(pt,qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observations.
A pair of utility functions U1pub and U
2
pub provides a public-CR of S (i.e. a collective
rationalization in terms of the collective model with only public consumption), if for
each observation t we have that Umpub (z) > U
m
pub (qt) implies U
l
pub (z) < U
l
pub (qt) (m 6=
l) for all z with ptqt ≥ ptz.
The second benchmark case assumes that all consumption is private, i.e. q1+q2 =
q (or qh = 0). In addition, the individuals have egoistic preferences, which implies
that they only care for their own consumption (i.e. no consumption externalities).
We formalize this by assuming individual preferences that are represented by a well-
behaved utility function Umego(q
m), with m = 1, 2. The corresponding concept of
collective rationality is as follows.
Definition 3 (egoistic-CR) Let S = {(pt,qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observa-
tions. A pair of utility functions U1ego and U
2
ego provides an egoistic-CR of S (i.e. a
collective rationalization in terms of the collective model with all consumption private
and egoistic preferences), if for each observation t there exist feasible personalized
quantities q̂t, with q
h = 0, such that Umego (ẑ) > U
m
ego (q̂t) implies U
l
ego (ẑ) < U
l
ego (q̂t)
(m 6= l) for all feasible personalized quantities ẑ with ptqt ≥ ptz and zh = 0.
3 Revealed preference characterization
Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2010b) derived the revealed preference char-
acterizations for the three models discussed in the previous section. To formally define
these revealed preference conditions, we will use the concept of feasible personalized
prices p̂1 and p̂2.
p̂1 =
(
p1, p2, ph
)
and p̂2 =
(
p− p1,p− p2,p− ph) with
p1, p2, ph ∈ RN+ and pc ≤ p for c = 1, 2, h.
6
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This concept complements the concept of feasible personalized quantities defined
above: p̂1 and p̂2 capture the fraction of the price for the personalized quantities q̂
that is borne by the respective members. p1 and p2 refer to private quantities and
are used to express the willingness to pay for the externalities related to these private
quantities; ph refers to the public quantities and are similarly used to express the
willingness to pay for the public quantities.
The revealed preference conditions make use of the Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP). Varian (1982) introduced the GARP condition for individually
rational behavior for observed prices and quantities; i.e. he showed that it is a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the observed quantity choices to maximize a single
utility function under the given budget constraint. We focus on the same condition
in terms of feasible personalized prices and quantities; the next Proposition 1 will
establish that collective rationality as defined in the above definitions requires GARP
consistency for each individual member.
Definition 4 Consider feasible personalized prices and quantities for a set of obser-
vations S = {(pt,qt); t = 1, . . . , T}. For m = 1, 2, the set {(p̂mt , q̂mt ) ; t = 1, ..., T}
satisfies GARP if there exist relations Rm0 , R
m that meet:
(i) if p̂ms q̂s ≥ p̂ms q̂t then q̂s Rm0 q̂t;
(ii) if q̂s R
m
0 q̂u, q̂u R
m
0 q̂v, . . . , q̂z R
m
0 q̂t for some (possibly empty) sequence (u, v,
..., z) then q̂s R
m q̂t;
(iii) if q̂s R
m q̂t, then p̂tq̂t ≤ p̂tq̂s.
We can now state the revealed preference characterization of the general collective
model (i.e. general-CR) that is derived in Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007).
Proposition 1 Let S = {(pt,qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observations. The follow-
ing conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a combination of well-behaved utility functions U1 and U2 that provide
a general-CR of S;
(ii) there exist feasible personalized prices and quantities such that for each member
m = 1, 2, the set {(p̂mt , q̂t) ; t = 1, ..., T} satisfies GARP.
Essentially, condition (ii) states that collective rationality requires individual ra-
tionality (i.e. GARP consistency) of each member in terms of personalized prices
7
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and quantities. In general, however, the true personalized prices and quantities are
unobserved. Therefore, it is only required that there must exist at least one set of
feasible personalized prices and quantities that satisfies the condition.
The characterization in Proposition 1 is easily adapted to the two benchmark
cases considered in the previous section; see also Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2010b) for more discussion. For a public-CR of the data we need to include that
all consumption is public. The implication is that only the willingness to pay for
the public consumption will be relevant for the GARP test. This is contained in the
following result.
Proposition 2 Let S = {(pt,qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observations. The follow-
ing conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a combination of well-behaved utility functions U1pub and U
2
pub that
provide a public-CR of S;
(ii) there exist feasible personalized prices and quantities, with q1t = q
2
t = 0, such that
for each member m = 1, 2, the set {(p̂mt , q̂t) ; t = 1, ..., T} satisfies GARP.
Similarly, for an egoistic-CR of the data we need to add to the second condition
that all consumption is private (i.e. qht = 0) and that the preferences are egoistic,
implying that the willingness to pay for externalities is zero (i.e. p1t = pt and p
2
t = 0).
Proposition 3 Let S = {(pt,qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observations. The follow-
ing conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a combination of well-behaved utility functions U1ego and U
2
ego that
provide an egoistic-CR of S;
(ii) there exist feasible personalized prices, with p1t = pt and p
2
t = 0, and feasible
personalized quantities, with qht = 0, such that for each member m = 1, 2, the set
{(p̂mt , q̂t) ; t = 1, ..., T} satisfies GARP.
4 Testing the nature of goods
We next show that the nature of goods is testable, even if we only observe the aggre-
gate group behavior. More specifically, we will prove two main results by means of
example data sets. Firstly, we provide data sets for which there exists a general-CR
8
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but not a public-CR or, respectively, an egoistic-CR. This implies that consistency
with the general model does not necessarily imply consistency with any of the specific
benchmark models. Putting it differently, rejection of the specific benchmark models
in these examples is caused by the corresponding assumptions on the nature of the
goods and not by the Pareto efficiency assumption as such. Secondly, our example
data sets will show that the two benchmark models are independent from (or non-
nested with) each other, i.e. data consistency with one benchmark model does not
necessarily imply data consistency with the other benchmark model.
4.1 General-CR does not imply public-CR
The following example contains a data set for which there exists a general-CR but
not a public-CR. The Appendix proves our claims in the examples.
Example 1 Suppose that the dataset S contains the following 3 observations of bun-
dles consisting of 3 quantities:
q1 = (5, 2, 2)
′, q2 = (2, 5, 2)′, q3 = (2, 2, 5)′;
p1 = (4, 1, 1)
′, p2 = (1, 4, 1)′, p3 = (1, 1, 4)′.
This dataset S satisfies the conditions in Proposition 1 (i.e. there exists a general-
CR), but it rejects the conditions in Proposition 2 (i.e. there does not exist a public-
CR).
This example has two important implications. Firstly, as discussed in the intro-
duction, it contrasts with the results of Chiappori and Ekeland (2006): following a
(local) differential approach, these authors show that the general collective model and
the collective model with only public consumption are indistinguishable if one only
observes aggregate group behavior. Example 1 illustrates that this is no longer the
case if one adopts the (global) revealed preference approach.
Secondly, the example demonstrates that we need only three goods and three ob-
servations to obtain our conclusion. In fact, these numbers provide absolute lower
bounds on the number of goods and observations for the collective models to have
testable implications. Indeed, it can be verified that the conditions in Propositions
1 and 2 cannot be rejected if the number of observations or the number of goods is
9
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smaller than three.7 Thus, as soon as collective rationality can be rejected, we can
distinguish the specific model with all consumption public from the general collec-
tive consumption model. In this respect, it is also worth noting that the differential
approach needs at least five goods for verifying the testable implications of the collec-
tive consumption model characterized in Propositions 2; see Browning and Chiappori
(1998) and Chiappori and Ekeland (2006). The fact that our revealed preference
approach requires a smaller number of goods illustrates once more that the (global)
revealed preference approach can yield stronger testability conclusions than the (local)
differential approach.
4.2 General-CR does not imply egoistic-CR
We next provide an example with a data set for which there exists a general-CR but
not an egoistic-CR.
Example 2 Suppose that the dataset S contains the following 4 observations of bun-
dles consisting of 4 quantities:
q1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)
′, q2 = (0, 1, 0, 0)′, q3 = (0, 0, 1, 0)′, q4 = (0, 0, 0, 1)′;
p1 = (7, 4, 4, 4)
′, p2 = (4, 7, 4, 4)′, p3 = (4, 4, 7, 4)′, p4 = (4, 4, 4, 7)′.
This dataset S satisfies the conditions in Proposition 1 (i.e. there exists a general-
CR), but it rejects the conditions in Proposition 3 (i.e. there does not exist an egoistic-
CR).
Two remarks are in order. Similar to before, we conclude that the general collec-
tive model and the model with only private consumption and egoistic preferences are
distinguishable from each other. Inter alia, this implies that the private nature of the
goods is testable. Again, this conclusion contrasts with the one for the differential
approach. Next, for mathematical elegance we have used four goods in Example 2.8
Similar (but less elegant) examples exist for data sets that only consider three goods.
7If T = 2, one can easily verify that ph1 = p1 and p
h
2 = 0 is a solution for the GARP conditions in
Proposition 2 (and thus a fortiori also for the GARP conditions in Proposition 1). Next, if N = 2,
one can again verify that member 1 paying for the first good (i.e. (pht )1 = (p1)1) for all observations
t and, similarly, member 2 paying for the second good (i.e. (pht )2 = 0) for all observations t obtains
a solution for the GARP conditions in Proposition 2.
8A similar qualification applies to the use of zeroes in Example 2.
10
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A final observation applies to the number of observations in Example 2. We have
now used four observations, which contrasts with Example 1. In fact, in general we
need minimally four observations for the collective model with private goods and
egoistic preferences to be distinguishable from the general collective model. This
result is formalized in the following proposition, which we prove in the Appendix.
Proposition 4 Let S = {(pt,qt); t = 1, 2, 3} be a set of three observations. Suppose
that there exists a general-CR of S, then there also exists an egoistic-CR of S.
4.3 Independence of egoistic-CR and public-CR
So far, we have shown that the general collective model is distinguishable from the
two specific benchmark models. In the Appendix we argue that a similar conclusion
also holds for the two benchmark cases. More precisely, we show that there exists
an egoistic-CR for the data set considered in Example 1 and a public-CR for the
data set considered in Example 2. Generally, this obtains that data consistency with
one benchmark model does not necessarily imply data consistency with the other
benchmark model.
Another interesting implication of this result is that we need no more than four
observations and three goods to distinguish between the three collective consumption
models under study. This conclusion directly carries over to ‘intermediate’ collective
models that are situated between the two benchmark cases, i.e models which assume
that part of the goods is privately consumed (without externalities) while all other
goods are publicly consumed. See Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2010b) for a
detailed discussion (including revealed preference characterizations) of these interme-
diate models.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that the revealed preference approach implies different testability
conclusions for collective consumption models with alternative assumptions on the
(public or private) nature of goods. In particular, we obtain different testable im-
plications as soon as we have three goods and four observations. Interestingly, these
conclusions stand in sharp contrast with the existing results for the differential ap-
proach. As indicated before, our explanation is that we focus on revealed conditions
11
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.90
that are global in nature, whereas the differential approach focuses on local testabil-
ity conditions. As for practical applications, our results suggest that the practitioner
may fruitfully apply revealed preference conditions to verify if the data satisfies a par-
ticular specification of the collective model that (s)he wants to use in the empirical
analysis.
Appendix
Example 1
There exists a general-CR of S. Consider the following personalized quantities and
prices:
q̂1 = (q1,0,0), q̂2 = (
1
2
q2,
1
2
q2,0), q̂3 = (0,q3,0);
p1t = p1, p
2
t = 0 for t = 1, 2, 3.
Then one can easily verify that the GARP conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied
for both members. This implies that there exists a general-CR of S.
There exists an egoistic-CR of S. By Proposition 3 we can conclude that the above
construction also shows that there exists an egoistic-CR of S.
There does not exist a public-CR of S. Let us prove this ad absurdum and assume
that we have a construction of feasible prices that satisfy condition (ii) in Proposition
2.
Observe that for the given set of observations we have for any t, s ∈ {1, 2, 3}, with
t 6= s, that ptqt > ptqs. Therefore we must have for our solution of feasible prices
that either pht qt > p
h
t qs or (pt−pht )qt > (pt−pht )qs. As a result the GARP conditions
in Proposition 2 require that if pht qt ≥ pht qs, we must have that phsqs ≤ phsqt and thus
(ps − phs )qs > (ps − phs )qt. Or, alternatively, if q̂tR10q̂s, then we must have q̂sR20q̂t.
Given that this holds for any t, s ∈ {1, 2, 3}, with t 6= s, we may therefore conclude
that, without losing generality, the solution of feasible prices leads to (i) q̂1R
1
0q̂2 and
q̂2R
1
0q̂3 for member 1; and (ii) q̂3R
2
0q̂2 and q̂2R
2
0q̂1 for member 2.
Assume that ph2 = (pi1, pi2, pi3)
′. The GARP condition for member 1 in Proposition
12
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2 requires that
ph2q2 ≤ ph2q1 ⇔ 2pi1 + 5pi2 + 2pi3 ≤ 5pi1 + 2pi2 + 2pi3
⇔ 0 ≤ pi1 − pi2.
The GARP condition for member 2 in Proposition 2 requires that
(p2 − ph2)q2 ≤ (p2 − ph2)q3 ⇔ 2(1− pi1) + 5(4− pi2) + 2(1− pi3)
≤ 2(1− pi1) + 2(4− pi2) + 5(1− pi3)
⇔ 3 ≤ pi2 − pi3.
Together this implies that 3 ≤ pi2 ≤ pi1, which gives us the wanted contradiction since
by construction pi1 ≤ 1. We thus conclude that there cannot exists a public-CR of
the data set in Example 1.
Example 2
There exists a general-CR of S. Consider the following personalized quantities and
prices:
q̂1 = (0,0,q1), q̂2 = (0,0,q2), q̂3 = (0,0,q3), q̂4 = (0,0,q4);
ph1 = (6, 2, 2, 2)
′, ph2 = (4, 3.5, 0, 0)
′, ph3 = (4, 4, 3.5, 0)
′, ph4 = (2, 2, 2, 1)
′.
Then one can easily verify that the GARP conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied
for both members. This implies that there exists a general-CR of S.
There exists a public-CR of S. By Proposition 2 we can conclude that the above
construction also shows that there exists a public-CR of S.
There does not exist an egoistic-CR of S. Let us prove this ad absurdum and
assume that we have a construction of feasible prices that satisfy condition (ii) in
Proposition 3.
Again we observe that for the given set of observations we have for any t, s ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4}, with t 6= s, that ptqt > ptqs. Therefore, without losing generality, we can
as before assume that the solution of feasible prices leads to (i) q̂1R
1
0q̂2, q̂2R
1
0q̂3 and
13
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q̂3R
1
0q̂4 for member 1; and (ii) q̂4R
2
0q̂3, q̂3R
1
0q̂2 and q̂2R
2
0q̂1 for member 2.
Assume that q12 = (0, α, 0, 0) and q
1
3 = (0, 0, β, 0). The GARP conditions for the
two members in Proposition 3 require that the following holds:
p̂12q̂2 ≤ p̂12q̂1 ⇔ 7α ≤ 4;
p̂13q̂3 ≤ p̂13q̂2 ⇔ 7β ≤ 4α ≤ 4;
p̂22q̂2 ≤ p̂22q̂3 ⇔ 7(1− α) ≤ 4(1− β) ≤ 4;
p̂23q̂3 ≤ p̂23q̂4 ⇔ 7(1− β) ≤ 4.
This implies that 3
7
≤ α ≤ 4
7
, 3
7
≤ β ≤ 4
7
and 7β
4
≤ α and thus also that α ≥ 3
4
.
As such we obtain the wanted contradiction and we conclude that there cannot exist
an egoistic-CR of the data set in Example 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
Example 1 of Cherchye et al. (2007) shows that there cannot exist a general-CR of S
if we observe that p1q1 ≥ p1(q2 + q3), p2q2 ≥ p2(q1 + q3) and p3q3 ≥ p3(q1 + q2)
holds simultaneously. Without losing generality, we assume that p2q2 < p2(q1 + q3).
Consider the following personalized quantities and prices for an α ∈ [0, 1]:
q̂1 = (q1,0,0), q̂2 = (αq2, (1− α)q2,0), q̂3 = (0,q3,0);
p1t = p1, p
2
t = 0 for t = 1, 2, 3.
These feasible prices and quantities are consistent with the collective model with
only private goods (i.e. qht = 0) and egoistic preferences (i.e. p
1
t = pt and p
2
t = 0).
Given that p2q2 < p2(q1 + q3), there must exist an α ∈ [0, 1] such that αp2q2 <
p2q1 and (1 − α)p2q2 < p2q3. One can then easily verify that for such an α the
GARP conditions in Proposition 3 are satisfied for both members. This implies that
there exists an egoistic-CR of S.
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